



Multi-Strategy Absolute Return | Single Portfolio Manager

Capital preservation and compounding returns through disciplined risk allocation

➤ STRATEGY

AUM	INCEPTION	LIQUIDITY	STRUCTURE
c.200M	2006	Weekly	Lux SIF   Spanish SIL feeder   SMAs

➤ MTD PORTFOLIO DETAIL<sup>1</sup>

	RHO			Stoxx 50 <sup>2</sup>		
	RETURNS	VOL.	SHARPE <sup>3</sup>	RETURNS	VOL	SHARPE <sup>3</sup>
Month	1.4%	.	.	6.4%	.	.
YTD	6.4%	.	.	2.7%	.	.
1Y annualized	5.9%	6.0%	0.99	17.5%	13.4%	1.31
3Y annualized	7.3%	6.4%	1.13	13.5%	12.4%	1.09
Inception ann.	7.1%	9.8%	0.72	4.3%	17.1%	0.25

STRATEGY	EXPOSURE					P&L <sup>5</sup>
	LONG	SHORT	NET	GROSS	Gross <sup>4</sup>	NET
Active	2.5%	0.0%	2.5%	2.5%	0.8%	0.19%
Rel. Val.	37.0%	-34.8%	2.2%	71.8%	24.03%	0.92%
Macro	48.1%	-125.8%	-77.7%	174.0%	58.3%	-0.62%
Micro	4.3%	0.0%	4.3%	4.3%	1.4%	0.46%
Special Sits.	21.8%	0.0%	21.8%	21.8%	7.3%	0.49%
Deep Value	7.6%	0.0%	7.6%	7.6%	2.5%	0.09%
FX Hedges <sup>7</sup>	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.09%
Liquidity	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	16.7%	5.6%	0.00%
Total	138.0%	-160.6%	-22.6%	298.6%	100.0%	1.44%
Total <sup>6</sup>	115.2%	-166.7%	-51.6%	281.9%		

ASSET CLASS	EXPOSURE					P&L <sup>5</sup>
	LONG	SHORT	NET	GROSS	Gross <sup>4</sup>	NET
Equity	52.8%	-34.8%	18.1%	87.6%	29.3%	1.88%
Illiquids	6.1%	0.0%	6.1%	6.1%	2.0%	-0.08%
Corp. Bond	9.5%	-125.8%	-116.4%	135.3%	45.3%	0.25%
Govt. Bond	40.6%	0.0%	40.6%	40.6%	13.6%	-0.59%
FX Hedges	12.3%	0.0%	12.3%	12.3%	4.1%	-0.02%
Liquidity	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	16.7%	5.6%	0.00%
Total	138.0%	-160.6%	-22.6%	298.6%	100.0%	1.44%
Total <sup>6</sup>	115.2%	-166.7%	-51.6%	281.9%		

➤ MTD PORTFOLIO DETAIL<sup>1</sup>

COUNTRY	EXPOSURE					P&L <sup>5</sup>
	LONG	SHORT	NET	GROSS	Gross <sup>4</sup>	NET
Denmark	2.4%	0.0%	2.4%	2.4%	0.8%	0.17%
EU	37.1%	-125.8%	-88.7%	163.0%	54.6%	-0.08%
France	6.9%	-15.5%	-8.7%	22.4%	7.5%	-0.10%
Germany	17.2%	-9.4%	7.8%	26.5%	8.9%	0.60%
Greece	2.9%	0.0%	2.9%	2.9%	1.0%	1.01%
Italy	7.7%	-1.9%	5.8%	9.6%	3.2%	0.39%
Luxembourg	9.4%	0.0%	9.4%	9.4%	3.2%	-0.37%
Portugal	0.0%	-3.0%	-3.0%	3.0%	1.0%	-0.24%
Spain	11.1%	-5.0%	6.2%	16.1%	5.4%	-0.55%
UK	5.7%	0.0%	5.7%	5.7%	1.9%	0.17%
USA	14.0%	0.0%	14.0%	14.0%	4.7%	0.07%
Venezuela	6.9%	0.0%	6.9%	6.9%	2.3%	0.37%
Liquidity	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	16.7%	5.6%	0.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>138.0%</b>	<b>-160.6%</b>	<b>-22.6%</b>	<b>298.6%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.44%</b>

SECTOR	EXPOSURE					P&L <sup>5</sup>
	LONG	SHORT	NET	GROSS	Gross <sup>4</sup>	NET
Comm. Services	3.7%	0.0%	3.7%	3.7%	1.2%	0.18%
Cons. Disc.	1.9%	-2.1%	-0.2%	4.1%	1.4%	0.00%
Cons. Staples	0.9%	0.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.3%	0.00%
Cons. Cyclical	1.8%	0.0%	1.8%	1.8%	0.6%	-0.05%
Cons. Non-Cyc.	5.3%	0.0%	5.3%	5.3%	1.8%	0.30%
Currency	12.3%	0.0%	12.3%	12.3%	4.1%	0.00%
Energy	7.3%	0.0%	7.3%	7.3%	2.4%	0.25%
Financials	31.7%	-150.9%	-119.2%	182.6%	61.1%	0.79%
Government	40.6%	0.0%	40.6%	40.6%	13.6%	-0.55%
Healthcare	0.6%	0.0%	0.6%	0.6%	0.2%	0.00%
Industrial	4.5%	-5.9%	-1.4%	10.3%	3.5%	0.48%
IT	1.5%	0.0%	1.5%	1.5%	0.5%	0.00%
Materials	0.3%	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%	0.00%
Private Equity	6.0%	0.0%	6.0%	6.0%	2.0%	0.00%
Real Estate	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.00%
Technology	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.00%
Utilities	2.7%	-1.7%	1.0%	4.5%	1.5%	0.04%
Liquidity	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	16.7%	5.6%	0.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>138.0%</b>	<b>-160.6%</b>	<b>-22.6%</b>	<b>298.6%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.44%</b>

## ➤ MTD PORTFOLIO DETAIL<sup>1</sup>

LIQUIDITY		MONTHLY PARAMETRIC VaR				
Norm. GROSS EXPOSURE		(99.5% CONFIDENCE)				
		Low	Range	Max.	◆ Avg.	● Now
Cash	0.0%					
Very Liquid	91.5%	1.97%		30.53%	9.03%	5.35%
Liquid	2.1%					
Semi Liquid	4.4%					
Illiquid	2.1%					

## ➤ MTD POSITION DETAIL<sup>1</sup>

NET EXPOSURE					
LONG			SHORT		
Position	% NAV (Delta Exposure)	Market Value as a % NAV	Position	% NAV (Delta Exposure)	Market Value as a % NAV
EU Bond 4% 2055	25.6%	25.6%	Itraxx Subfin 6y CDS	-125.8%	-16.9%
BNP Dec 26 (100 Call)	15.8%	1.7%	BNP Dec 26 (110 Call)	-12.3%	-0.5%
Stoxx 50 Jun 26 (6275 Call)	6.3%	0.1%	Stoxx600 T&L Jun 26 Futures	-4.8%	-4.8%
French Gvt Bond 0.5% 2072	6.0%	6.0%	SX7E Jun 26 Futures	-3.3%	-3.3%
Stoxx 50 Jun 26 (5000 Put)	4.6%	4.6%	Acciona Holding Common Stock	-3.2%	-3.2%

MACRO CONTEXT

**decoherence [n.]**

*physics*

the process in which a system's behaviour changes from that which can be explained by quantum mechanics to that which can be explained by classical mechanics any active hostility, contention, or struggle; conflict; e.g. the war against disease

*Collins English Dictionary. Copyright © HarperCollins Publishers*

Those who know me well know that I have had a long-standing love affair with paradoxes. Maybe it is because I have always perceived myself, paraphrasing Kris Kristofferson in his song “The Pilgrim”, as “...a walking contradiction, partly truth and partly fiction”, that from an early age I have been inherently attracted to philosophical and scientific antinomies. Somehow, I must have figured out that understanding and reconciling the paradoxes posed by some of the wisest minds in history would bring me closer to solving the most puzzling sudoku of all: understanding the self and the search for human purpose. And so, I embarked on a fascinating journey that took me from Zeno of Elea and his paradoxes of motion, through Epimenides, Thomas Aquinas, Georg Cantor, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Erwin Schrödinger, culminating in the discovery of master Dōgen Zenji and, ultimately, in taking the Soto Zen precepts in a ceremony (jukai) at a Buddhist temple.

And whilst, even for those who think they know me well, I can be a human version of Forrest Gump’s box of chocolates, I am far more predictable and easier to understand than the quantum world. It was, in fact, a book I am currently reading about the mathematical nature of the universe that led me to think about the current state of markets through the lens of physics. The quantum world can only be characterised as “very weird” from our predominantly deterministic understanding, to the point that the physicist Werner Heisenberg once famously said: “not only is the Universe stranger than we think, it is stranger than we can think.”

In the subatomic quantum world, many states of reality can coexist as superpositions, until the quantum wavefunction collapses — not necessarily because of a conscious observer, but more broadly due to interaction with the environment. In such a world, a radioactive isotope both decays and does not decay simultaneously, so good old Erwin Schrödinger’s cat is both dead and alive at the same time. Once decoherence takes place, we are back in familiar territory: the deterministic world of cause and effect, where Schrödinger’s cat is regrettably found dead (yes, I did consider the more cheerful alternative quantum state, but I am a sucker for a sad story — and science does have a track record rife with animal cruelty).

As I have been puzzled by diverging price action across asset classes, markets and sectors, I have grown increasingly convinced that **only by viewing very short-term financial market behaviour through the lens of quantum systems can we reconcile the simultaneous pricing of incompatible macro states:**

- soft landing and recession risk
- disinflation and structural inflation
- geopolitical escalation and contained risk premia

Thus, in the short term, markets are not solving for equilibrium; they are merely sampling from a distribution of competing realities and therefore exhibit quantum-like characteristics. But **this “quantum state” of markets** is not just an abstract coexistence of narratives — it **is rooted in the heterogeneity of market participants themselves**. Different investors are, in effect, observing — and therefore “measuring” — different versions of reality.

**EQUITY MARKETS**, particularly in segments heavily influenced by retail participation and momentum-driven flows, tend to emphasise:

- forward growth narratives
- technological disruption
- liquidity and sentiment

Retail investors, systematic trend followers, and parts of the long-only community often operate on shorter feedback loops, where price itself becomes information. In such an environment, narratives can reinforce themselves, and markets can sustain states that appear disconnected from broader macro signals.

## MACRO CONTEXT

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By contrast, **FIXED INCOME MARKETS** remain more heavily dominated by institutional investors:

- central banks
- pension funds
- insurance companies
- macro hedge funds

These participants are structurally more sensitive to:

- inflation dynamics
- fiscal sustainability
- real rates and term premia

Their investment horizons, constraints, and frameworks impose a more disciplined, and arguably more “Newtonian”, interpretation of reality — even in the short term.

**COMMODITY MARKETS** add yet another layer. They are influenced not only by financial flows but also by:

- physical supply and demand
- inventory dynamics
- geopolitical constraints

Here, participants range from producers and consumers hedging real exposures to macro funds expressing views on global cycles. As a result, commodities often embed signals that sit somewhere between the reflexivity of equities and the macro discipline of rates.

**The consequence is that, in the short term, different asset classes are not simply disagreeing — they are effectively operating within different observational frameworks.**

Each group of investors, with its own objectives, constraints, and information set, “measures” the market differently. And just as in quantum mechanics, where measurement defines the observed state, these differing perspectives allow multiple states to persist simultaneously.

This is what gives rise to the superposition:

- equities pricing a benign growth outlook
- rates pricing inflation risk and tighter financial conditions
- commodities reflecting geopolitical and supply-side stress

These are not transient inconsistencies — they are the natural outcome of a system in which no single observational framework dominates in the short term.

**As a result, we can experience a “Schrödinger’s market”** in which stocks have reached all-time highs whilst interest rate curves and oil markets discount a very challenging environment for economic growth. **In the current environment, our market feline seems very much dead and alive at the same time.**

There are, of course, precedents of deep contradictions in pricing across markets. The most notorious episode I traded through was 2008, when there was a clear and persistent divergence between equity and credit markets. Equities, for a time, failed to reflect the mounting stress already visible in CDS spreads and funding markets — until, eventually, reality asserted itself.

But just as particles at the quantum level can become entangled, so too can financial markets. Assets that appear unrelated in calm conditions can suddenly exhibit strong and instantaneous correlations under stress, linked not by fundamentals but by the same positioning, liquidity, and constraints that generated the contradictions. A shock in one corner of the system propagates rapidly across others, revealing hidden interdependencies that were not previously apparent. In this sense, markets are less a collection of independent assets and more a tightly coupled system whose internal linkages only become visible when tested.

## MACRO CONTEXT

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I introduced, at the beginning of my mad rant, decoherence as the process by which superpositions lose their ability to interfere, and a classical, stable reality emerges. **In market terms, decoherence is the gradual process through which competing narratives lose their ability to coexist.**

Markets do not jump directly from confusion to clarity — they pass through a process of decoherence in which contradictions are gradually suppressed until a dominant trajectory emerges.

In the short term, attempting to impose a single coherent narrative on markets is often futile. Prices reflect a weighted coexistence of multiple states, and divergences across assets can persist far longer than classical intuition would suggest.

But over longer horizons, those divergences tend not to be sustainable. Decoherence ensures that, eventually, one narrative prevails, and markets re-enter a regime in which traditional relationships — between growth, inflation, policy and asset prices — once again hold.

Which brings us back to the present. If we are indeed in a quantum-like phase of the market, the key question is not which narrative is correct, but rather [what process will drive decoherence, and which state of the world will ultimately survive it?](#)

Because when the system finally resolves, as it always does, markets will stop sampling possibilities — and start following a path. Thus, identifying the process through which decoherence will manifest itself in the current market will be key to formulating the right investment and risk management strategy as we move from the quantum into the Newtonian.

Valuations are a function of probability-weighted cash flow discounting. Interest rates (read repo, opportunity cost, ROE hurdle, etc.) remain the most basic building block in pricing any financial asset or derivatives thereof. Interest rates have been subjected to a range of aggressive narratives since the end of last year: geopolitical risk, fiscal expansion, energy shocks, etc. The significant repricing of nominal yields has thus far failed to feed through to credit or equity markets.

The aftermath of 2022 painted a rosy picture for stocks: in yet another feat of Wall Street greed, companies not only managed to pass on supply-chain disruption costs to consumers, but they also actually embarked on a margin expansion binge. Households at the time were enjoying significant post-pandemic precautionary savings, so they happily accommodated corporate greed at the expense of disposable income.

Additionally, artificially low interest rates supported not only consumption but also an illusory dream among members of the “99% crowd” of a fast-track pass into financial and crypto wealth, granting them access to the “1% club”. Speculative retail activity in financial markets resembled that sad budget-airline customer who, emboldened by a €5 speedy-boarding option as an add-on to an €80 ticket fare, displays at the boarding gate the confidence and entitlement of a Singapore Airlines customer about to turn left at the airplane gate into a suite.

Sadly, more often than not, the history of excesses and bubbles ends bitterly for the aspirations of the have-nots who have bet the house on capturing the last penny of the rally.

As we have discussed in previous notes, much of the froth in financial markets can be explained through a monetary lens. This time is no different. If good old Milton Friedman were to rise from the grave, he would be horrified by the scale of broad money aggregates.

In the aftermath of the failed policy responses to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, central banks have grown wiser that their reaction function to exogenous shocks must be strong and decisive in order to prevent inflation expectations from becoming structurally entrenched.

If the Hormuz impasse drags on, Volcker-style medicine is in order. In that scenario, policy response will bring about decoherence of the quantum system: Schrödinger’s cat will die, and so will the wealth aspirations of many retail traders.

If, instead, we see a quick resolution of the Iran conflict, the rally may live on, supported by the AI narrative and accommodative monetary policy. Time is ticking, and the real economy is running out of it before the temporary energy shock inflicts structural damage on the system. Eventually, that damage will find its way through the cracks of the financial economy.

Across both possible scenarios surrounding the Iran conflict, **risk remains asymmetrically skewed to the downside, and we remain broadly positioned to capture that convex pay-off.**

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FUND PERFORMANCE

During the month of April, the fund generated a +1.44% gain in a bullish environment characterised by a rebound in risk sentiment, as the ever-changing and conflicting news around the Iran conflict pointed to an agreement between Iran and the US, which has yet to materialise and might be further away than the market is pricing, as Iran has more bargaining power than the markets or DJT give it credit for.

By comparison, the Euro Stoxx 50 delivered a total return of +3.63% during the month, while the Ibex 35 gained +3.75%. In the US, the AI narrative sprang back to life in full force, with the S&P 500 and Nasdaq 100 gaining +8.33% and +12.55%, respectively, in USD terms.

In cash credit markets, the iBoxx EUR Corporates Overall Total Return Index gained +0.33% and the iBoxx EUR Liquid High Yield Total Return Index +1.27%. In synthetic credit, the iTraxx 5-year Main CDS Index and the iTraxx 5-year Crossover CDS Index returned +0.58% and +2.15%, respectively.

It is worth noting that despite the relative underperformance in April, **RHO Investments still comfortably beats European equity indices on a year-to-date basis** (+3.26% vs the Euro Stoxx 50 and +2.70% vs the Ibex 35 as of the May 13 fund NAV) **and, more importantly, does so with modest levels of risk utilisation and a very defensive strategic allocation which relies mainly on delta-neutral positioning.**

This defensive stance and our characteristic proactive risk-management approach for crisis periods (as outlined in our [Crises Manual](#)) have translated into a realised weekly volatility profile over the last six months that ranges between 43% and 48% of the volatility associated with the main European equity indices.

BY TRADE TYPE

<p>Active +0.2%</p>	<p>The bucket benefited from higher intra-day volatility levels across European futures and options markets and a reopening of primary credit markets after the shutdown during the height of the Iran conflict. Gains in the bucket were generated through short-term strategic trading in European bond futures, single-name equity options and trading new-issue premia in credit markets.</p>
<p>Relative Value +0.9%</p>	<p>Activity in this bucket followed the blueprint we reproduce again below and which we outlined in our previous newsletter.</p> <p>The priority during the month was degrossing the RV bucket for three distinct reasons, all of which are part of our time-tested crisis-management blueprint:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To avoid running less-liquid idiosyncratic exposures that a macro-focused environment fails to reward</li> <li>2. Since correlations break down when volatility spikes, we decided to take profits to protect the portfolio from a significant increase in correlation risk</li> <li>3. To release some prudential cash in order to gain portfolio flexibility against changes in margining policies from PBs, but more importantly, to be able to efficiently deploy investor capital into market dislocations derived from the sharp sell-off</li> </ol> <p>As part of our drive to lighten up on risk within the RV bucket, we continued to take profits on lower-yield and bond-correlated merger arbitrage trades that we were running in Italian banks, with long Mediobanca vs short BAMI contributing +0.50% in terms of performance over total portfolio NAV during the month and long Sondrio vs short BPE generating just 2bps.</p> <p>Further degrossing led to crystallising P&amp;L and shielding fundamental trades from all the potential noise and technical dislocations typical of the European reporting season over the last few years, by exiting a few long-short equity pairs: long Greek construction company GEK Terna vs short Eurostoxx 600 Construction Index (+0.14%), long Eurobank vs short Caixabank (+0.40%) and long National Bank of Greece vs short BCP (+4bps).</p>
<p>Macro -0.6%</p>	<p>Performance within the bucket had three distinct drivers:</p>

BY TRADE TYPE

<p>Macro -0.6%</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Activity in Eurostoxx front-month volatility trades. As the option index skew normalised and spot rallied, we exited bullish trades established as momentum built around the Iran conflict, as the bullish nature and highly asymmetric profile complemented positioning across other buckets. Given the likelihood that the market would reach an impasse and uncertainty around negotiations, it made sense to minimise time decay and exposure to a collapse in vega, and we exited remaining macro option positions, which contributed 0.20% of performance in terms of total portfolio NAV during the month.</li> <li>• A negative drag from remaining European government bond exposure, which, although vulnerable to further inflationary concerns, is currently not pricing second-order economic deceleration effects, and contributes attractive risk-adjusted carry to option and bearish exposures elsewhere in the portfolio. The most salient contributor within this pillar was EU 4% 2055 bonds, which generated a -0.47% loss in terms of NAV, as the long end of EU curves widened meaningfully amid new supply pressures.</li> <li>• We still think that systemic tail-risk scenarios remain significantly underpriced, particularly in the context of potential stress in private credit funds and banks' exposure to BDCs through NAV lending structures. To express this view, we took advantage of the recent squeeze in credit spreads and technicals around the S44/S45 roll to re-enter our short credit-risk exposure with meaningful size in terms of NAV (c. 1.25x) but limited downside, given the market traded spread of just 90 running bps for the five-year maturity of the index. This exposure generated a mere -0.10% loss during the month despite the significantly bullish market tone.</li> </ul>
<p>Micro +0.5%</p>	<p>Risk allocation to this bucket remains well below historical averages, reflecting both the scarcity of compelling fundamental value opportunities in still-elevated equity and credit markets and a macro-driven environment that does not adequately reward idiosyncratic exposures.</p> <p>However, following the Iran war-related sell-off, we are beginning to see new opportunities gradually emerge.</p> <p>Portfolio positioning remains concentrated in a limited number of highly idiosyncratic investments, characterised by deeply depressed valuations relative to even our most conservative model assumptions. At current price levels, these positions offer a substantial margin of safety in the event of a significant systematic market correction.</p> <p>Performance in the bucket was largely driven by mark-to-market gains in shares of Spanish travel-tech company HBX (+0.2%) and French electronic payments company Worldline (+0.2%).</p> <p>Towards the end of the month, we capitalised on the heavy sell-off in the defence space to add shares of CSG at a discount of c. 25% to the January IPO levels, which seems unjustified in the context of the significant need to bridge the defence gap versus NATO targets across all EU state budgets and the limited supply of intra-EU industrials within the defence sector.</p>
<p>Special Situations +0.5%</p>	<p>This strategy remains concentrated in a limited number of idiosyncratic positions, primarily Thames Water and Venezuela/PDVSA restructuring opportunities, while broader M&amp;A activity — excluding financials, which we continue to express through relative value trades — remains subdued.</p> <p>Private debt refinancing at questionable valuations continues to delay the emergence of a full distressed debt cycle, limiting the availability of broader special situations opportunities.</p> <p>Venezuelan assets saw a significant further rally because, on the one hand, of the very favourable macro environment for Venezuelan GDP recovery given higher oil prices and, on the other, strong political signals from the US administration and domestically from the Venezuelan cabinet in terms of facilitating a swift and all-encompassing restructuring process.</p> <p>As a result of the rally, exposure across Venezuela and PDVSA bonds in terms of NAV has grown from 6.6% to 7.4% month-on-month.</p>

BY TRADE TYPE

<p>Special Situations +0.5%</p>	<p>Despite the recent rally, we still see substantial medium-term upside due to three significant factors:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The markedly market-friendly policies adopted by the new Delcy administration</li> <li>2. The elevated profitability of heavy Venezuelan crude at elevated oil spot prices</li> <li>3. The high PDI nature of our claims, and the favourable structural characteristics of the securities (no CACs on PDVSA bonds and only old-style high-threshold, non-aggregation CACs on sovereign series)</li> </ol>
<p>Deep Value +0.1%</p>	<p>The strategy remains focused on a thematic long-term position in the structural growth potential of the US telehealth sector, which we believe will increasingly benefit from the expanding role of AI as a secular growth driver.</p>

RISK METRICS

From a risk perspective, net market exposure decreased significantly from +95% at the end of March to -52% at the end of April as the fund took profits on delta-adjusted bullish equity exposures during the market rally and entered into a significant — in notional terms yet very modest in risk terms — short risk exposure via the iTraxx Subfin CDS Index.

Gross exposure increased from 193% to 281%, largely because of the aforementioned CDS index exposure.

From a statistical standpoint, using a one-day parametric Value at Risk (VaR) at a 99.5% confidence level, we can see that overall risk utilisation remains very moderate and well below historical averages.

The fund closed the month with a VaR of 1.05%, representing a 17bps decrease relative to the end of March.

Similarly, average daily VaR utilisation during the month declined by 15bps month-on-month to 1.14%.

## ➤ RHO INVESTMENTS HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YTD
2006	1.2%	0.7%	0.0%	0.4%	-0.6%	0.6%	0.1%	0.8%	0.8%	0.9%	1.8%	1.2%	8.2%
2007	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	-0.6%	-1.0%	0.1%	-0.3%	-0.2%	0.4%	1.3%	-2.2%	-0.7%	-2.4%
2008	-0.8%	-1.3%	-0.4%	1.8%	0.1%	-2.6%	-1.0%	0.5%	-5.1%	-3.3%	0.4%	-0.5%	-11.8%
2009	0.7%	-2.0%	6.5%	7.1%	3.0%	1.4%	4.7%	6.2%	1.4%	2.2%	1.9%	0.0%	38.0%
2010	1.6%	0.5%	2.3%	0.8%	-1.8%	0.0%	7.4%	-6.0%	0.7%	2.1%	-3.1%	-1.4%	2.5%
2011	4.7%	3.8%	-1.0%	-0.9%	-0.2%	1.4%	0.5%	-3.1%	-1.9%	3.1%	-2.5%	1.7%	5.4%
2012	5.9%	4.2%	3.6%	-0.7%	-4.1%	3.5%	-2.6%	1.9%	4.2%	-1.8%	2.3%	4.1%	22.1%
2013	4.8%	-1.9%	0.4%	-3.6%	-0.4%	-0.2%	2.9%	-0.7%	5.3%	5.2%	2.5%	3.7%	19.0%
2014	2.6%	4.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.3%	-0.9%	1.1%	-5.1%	0.6%	-1.1%	1.9%	-0.1%	4.2%
2015	2.2%	6.5%	0.9%	0.2%	-1.3%	1.6%	1.1%	-2.8%	-4.0%	3.0%	0.9%	-1.4%	6.7%
2016	-2.7%	-2.6%	-0.8%	7.9%	-0.1%	1.1%	0.4%	-0.1%	0.6%	-0.2%	0.6%	2.3%	6.2%
2017	2.1%	2.9%	3.7%	0.4%	0.4%	1.6%	0.6%	-0.6%	0.0%	-0.7%	0.9%	0.9%	12.8%
2018	4.1%	-2.7%	-0.1%	2.2%	-4.4%	-0.4%	0.2%	-2.6%	-0.4%	-2.3%	0.2%	-4.0%	-9.9%
2019	4.5%	0.1%	-2.5%	0.3%	-0.8%	-4.4%	-2.5%	-1.8%	3.2%	1.5%	0.1%	1.8%	-0.7%
2020	1.2%	1.8%	-16.9%	2.9%	2.0%	5.7%	2.5%	2.2%	2.7%	-2.4%	16.0%	2.3%	18.3%
2021	1.6%	1.8%	2.7%	1.6%	0.4%	0.7%	-1.5%	0.9%	3.1%	1.4%	-0.2%	0.4%	13.8%
2022	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%	-3.8%	0.7%	-2.2%	1.7%	0.1%	-4.0%	2.2%	4.8%	-1.9%	-2.0%
2023	5.2%	1.7%	-5.7%	2.5%	0.4%	2.1%	1.2%	-0.9%	-1.4%	-0.7%	4.7%	5.5%	15.0%
2024	-0.1%	-1.8%	2.3%	-0.3%	1.2%	0.6%	1.7%	-0.5%	-0.1%	0.0%	1.8%	-0.6%	4.0%
2025	-0.9%	2.9%	-2.4%	1.3%	1.0%	0.7%	-0.7%	-2.5%	0.5%	1.9%	-0.1%	-1.2%	0.3%
2026	4.6%	1.0%	-0.7	1.4%									6.4%

<sup>1</sup> Subtotal or sums may not visually add or match the corresponding subtotal in another section of the report due to rounding.

<sup>2</sup> Reference indices are provided for market context only and do not represent benchmarks or targets of the strategy. Stoxx 50 performance reflects dividends received but assumes no dividend reinvestment.

<sup>3</sup> Sharpe ratio calculated using a 0% risk-free rate.

<sup>4</sup> Adjusted Gross exposure (normalized): calculated as total long plus total short exposures expressed as a percentage of NAV, with NAV set at 100% for comparability purposes.

<sup>5</sup> P&L figures are net of fees and refer to RHO Multi-Strategy or Sub-Fund A, share class A (EUR) (ISIN: LU1610886332), a sub-fund of Quadriga Funds SICAV SIF (the "Company") as of April 29, 2026.

<sup>6</sup> Adjusted Total Exposure: Total gross exposure excludes cash balances, as liquidity does not represent active market risk. Total net exposure excludes both cash and FX hedges, as currency hedging positions are risk-mitigating and do not constitute directional market exposure.

<sup>7</sup> In the Asset Class breakdown, the FX Hedges line aggregates all currency hedges in the portfolio (both portfolio-level and trade/strategy-specific hedges). In the Strategy breakdown, the FX Hedges line reflects only portfolio-level hedges. Strategy-specific FX hedges are included within the relevant strategy exposures.

<sup>8</sup> Due to differences in valuation frequency, index returns in the CIO commentary are calculated using data aligned with the fund's valuation date (latest available NAV), whereas tabulated index returns are based on month-end closing levels.

## ➤ ABOUT THE COMPANY

RHO is supported by Quadriga Asset Managers, an independent investment platform with over **€1.5bn under management**. Quadriga provides institutional infrastructure, risk oversight and operational support, allowing the investment team to focus exclusively on portfolio management.

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