

April, 2023

## Nominal vs Real Recession

### 1. Monthly Update Quadriga UCITS Strategies

#### 1.1. Protected US Equity, Quadriga Aqua UCITS -1.2% Apr 23, +6.5% YTD


The enclosed [Aqua UCITS Apr23 Factsheet](#) provides a detailed overview of the performance and positioning across the core equities and long insurance portfolios. The Protected US Equity Strategy combines the benefits of a core long 100% US Equities protected with a long-only Insurance Program where both components are rebalanced monthly to their neutral weights. The long only insurance has a target of 10% to 15% in **premium-at-risk** and is **managed pari-passu with Igneo UCITS**.

A switch from **Unprotected Equity to Protected Equity** is subject to a number of benefits and considerations, including:

- **Switch Unprotected Equity for Protected Equity** with **zero net cash-flow** requirement.
- **Remain invested** in US equities, but **enhance protection** at expense of potential basis risk and underperformance vs passive equity markets.
- **Reduce volatility** and enhance risk adjusted returns (**Sharpe Ratio** and **Sortino Ratio**).
- **Reduce “noise”**. One line item, instead of two. Less emotions during extremes tend to produce better decisions.
- **Embrace hostile markets**. Buy cheap equities financed by profits on insurance.
- **Embrace complacent markets**. Buy cheap insurance financed by profits on equities.
- **Monthly Rebalancing**. Incremental Returns from Negative Correlation and Mean Reversion.
- **Attractive Entry**. Current valuations in US Equities and Insurance offer attractive entry for protected strategies like Aqua.
- **Seeding terms** class A USD ISIN **LU1871084460** a 1.5% management fee, 0% performance fee, daily liquidity at NAV.

As per the graph below, Protected US strategies can help enhance absolute returns (+10.6% p.a. vs +10.4% p.a.) and risk-adjusted returns, (both return per unit of average volatility, Sharpe 0.7 vs 0.6) and return per unit of "bad volatility" (Sortino 1.6 vs 0.9), whilst simultaneously enhancing capital preservation as Peak to Trough (-10.9% vs -23.9%).


	Monthly (%)	YTD (%)	LTD (%)	LTD (% p.a.)	Vol (%)	Sharpe	Sortino	Peak Trough	NAV
SPX	1.5%	9.0%	62.7%	10.6%	19.0%	0.6	0.9	-23.9%	162.7
AQUA	-1.2%	6.5%	61.5%	10.4%	14.3%	0.7	1.6	-10.9%	161.5
Difference	-2.6%	-2.5%	-1.2%	-0.2%	-4.7%	0.2	0.6	13.0%	-1.2



### Passive Basket vs Rebalanced Basket

In addition to the contribution from the Equity and Insurance Portfolios, Quadriga Aqua UCITS Protected US Equity benefits from another important consideration: **portfolio rebalancing**, a mechanism that effectively behaves like a **good unemotional investor** that **systematically accumulates cheap insurance during complacent markets** (such as today) and **systematically accumulates distressed assets during hostile markets** (such as March 2020). Those investors managing the long equity and long insurance via separate legs tend to suffer from emotional distress and make the wrong decisions at the wrong time.

The following graph compares the performance of a passive basket vs monthly rebalanced basket, where the difference represents the value of **compounding capital preservation**. No crystal ball. No magic formula. Just unemotional systematic rebalancing, which in our view can be a valuable source of compounding and incremental returns in general, and during the high volatility regime we anticipate ahead.



### 1.2. Quadriga Igneo UCITS, -2.8% Apr 23 (+7% May 23 as of 6th May)

The enclosed [Igneo UCITS Apr23 Factsheet](#) provides a detailed overview of the performance and positioning, including closed, restructured, and new positions. The **Total Premium at Risk** for Igneo was **30.7%** as of the end of April, with a **diversified insurance portfolio 1) across asset classes** (Equity/Credit, FX/Rates, Commodity Inflation) **2) across maturities** (short dates directional gamma and long dates Vega and duration),

**3) convexity and risk premia** (long vanilla bias and risk premia across the forward term-structure, volatility surface, and correlation matrix) subject to constraints on **premium at risk** (long only option) and **carry** (positive, neutral and negative), which altogether seek to generate **negatively correlated alpha** during **adverse, hostile and volatile** markets, as the strategy has consistently done since launch its launch (+12.7% 4Q18, +16.5% Aug19, +42.5% 1Q20, or +22.2% Feb22, amongst others) and as we hope to do during the hostile and volatile markets we anticipate ahead of us.

	T < 1y	1y < T < 3y	T > 3y	TOTAL
EQUITY & CREDIT	4.7%	0.0%	0.0%	4.7%
FX & INTEREST RATES	5.5%	0.8%	7.0%	13.3%
COMMODITIES & INFLATION	10.0%	2.7%	0.0%	12.7%
TOTAL	20.2%	3.5%	7.0%	30.7%

	CONVEXITY	CARRY	TOTAL
EQUITY & CREDIT	3.5%	1.1%	4.7%
FX & INTEREST RATES	13.3%	0.0%	13.3%
COMMODITIES & INFLATION	0.0%	12.7%	12.7%
TOTAL	16.9%	13.9%	30.7%

	T < 1y	1y < T < 3y	T > 3y	TOTAL
CONVEXITY	9.0%	0.8%	7.0%	16.9%
CARRY	11.2%	2.7%	0.0%	13.9%
TOTAL	20.2%	3.5%	7.0%	30.7%

## 2. Anti-Bubble Report April 2023: "Nominal Recession vs Real Recession"

The Anti-Bubble Report is a free monthly newsletter focused on global macro. The title of month's Report, "Nominal Recession vs Real Recession", highlights the dramatic divergence of perspective between those looking at the world through the conventional lens of negligible inflation and those who have adjusted their perspective to a new reality of non-negligible inflation.

The "Twilight Zone" between Nominal and Real perspectives is creating confusion across market participants but the distinction between Nominal vs Real is no longer a choice. It is an obligation. Earlier this month ECB officials were proudly stating that Europe would likely avoid Recession as Europe was showing Nominal growth of 0.1% one day, only to see an *Official* Inflation print 7.5%. Yes, Europe is growing a 0.1% in Nominal Terms, but it is shrinking at 7.4% in Real Terms. And that's very *Official* Inflation, in my view is at least half of *Real* Inflation, and why the Real Real Growth may be much worse than officially stated.

The structure of the Report follows previous editions, and includes 1) "What happened? What's new?, What's changed?" since our last update, 2) in-depth analysis of our contrarian framework "The New Paradigm of High Inflation, High Volatility, and High Risk", 3) implications for portfolio construction, and 4) additional supportive information, including foundational components from previous newsletters and links to a selection of relevant articles and podcasts.

Any readers interested in learning more about our range of liquid investment strategies and solutions in the volatility and tail risk space, please feel free to contact me directly and I will connect with you with one of my

colleagues in the client coverage and solutions team to review the most suitable alternative based on our your investment objectives and needs, and add you to our distribution list for monthly updates and factsheets.

## 2.1 April 2023: What happened? What's new? What's changed?

The month of April was a relatively benign month for markets despite the slow-motion crash in the US regional bank sector and other worrying signs of fragility in the system.

- **The US Regional Banking Crisis Continues.** First Republic Bank (“FRB”) the latest victim and overtakes Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”) as the new second largest US bank collapse since Lehman in 2008. Mind-blowing that the recent collapse of FRB, SVB, and Signature Bank that happened during the past few weeks rank amongst the top 5 bankruptcies in the history of the US. We well know financial crises tend to follow reflexive processes where “fundamentals drive prices, but prices also drive fundamentals”, and neither look great for US Regional Banks.

- **Mummy and Daddy (and Cousins!) to the Rescue.** During the earlier stages of the crisis, Central Banks and Governments (“mummy and daddy”) were quick to come to the rescue and contain the wave of systemic risk. In the US, the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury were quick to implement "systemic risk exemption" to guarantee uninsured deposits. In Europe, the European Central Bank was quick to intervene and successfully contains risk following the collapse of Credit Suisse, a 200-year-old historic bank, with a forced take over by UBS, and the markets looking at Deutsche Bank as "next in line", within an environment of extreme confusion and chaos as the rules of the credit markets were changed with equity holders getting paid and AT1 bond holders wiped out. **The recent acquisition of FRB assets by JP Morgan was backed by** Jamie Diamon’s message and narrative that the issues are isolated and contained, but those old enough may remember Bear Stearns in 2007, may see some worrying parallels as JP Morgan and UBS are willingly or unwillingly stepping-in to contain what is an extremely fragile situation as/when the “domino effect” accelerates and raises questions about the limits of further potential Public and Private bail-outs, which in our view will undoubtedly continue as/when the crisis extends.

- **The Central Banks Hikes Continue.** The Federal Reserve delivered another 25bps in early May despite concerns about financial stability, bringing nominal interest rates to the 5% to 5.25% range, where a number of leading banks and economists such as Goldman Sachs expect the Fed to pause and stay for the balance of the year, in contrast to the expectations by the markets, which imply 2 cuts into year end. In Europe, the ECB also delivered another 25 bps, with more hikes expected.

- **Credit Defaults on the Rise.** The domino effects of the US Regional Banking sector do not affect just the banks and the depositors, but also the companies that rely on their loans, such as Commercial Real Estate (“CRE”), a sector that is suffering from multiple headwinds, including higher interest rates and changes in work dynamics following the pandemic. The credit stress arising from higher interest rates may not be that widespread or evident yet, but worth noting US courts recorded 57 large insolvencies in 1Q23, the worst quarter since 2009. Whilst the US is leading the charge of monetary normalization, those paying attention will notice signs of credit stress from higher interest rates are happening across multiple other regions and sectors.

- **High Inflation Prints.** US Core CPI data in April was above consensus at 4.6%. Inflation data in Europe also remains stubbornly high, with a print at 7.5%. In Japan, a country worried about deflation for decades, the trade unions negotiated largest wage hike in 30y at 3.76%. On the other hand, important drivers of inflation

such as energy continue to weaken, with crude oil prices sliding for the past 6 consecutive months despite the recent OPEC cuts.

- **“Nominal” Earnings remain Solid.** As per the title of this month’s newsletter, and as I will discuss in more detail later, Nominal Data, including Earnings, remains solid. I stress the attribute “Nominal” as Real performance is not as strong. More on this later. Worth noting US equity are displaying the narrowest stock leadership since the 1990s, with approx. 60% of YTD returns in the S&P 500 come from just 5 names helped by post-SVB liquidity injections and lower implied and realized volatility are contributing to inflows from systematic strategies that take the other side of discretionary managers, who are currently holding record short equities and Treasury futures.

- **US Debt Ceiling worries.** As evident by the surge in 1y US CDS, there are increasing concerns about the fact approaching US Debt Ceiling, which has been compounded by weaker than expected April tax collections. Worth keeping an eye as the budget fight into next year’s presidential election heats up. The impasse may result may be temporary government shutdown that will surely be eventually resolved but could affect sentiment and growth and act as catalyst for a wider move, as it was the case in previous rounds, such as 2011.

- **Equity vs Fixed Income.** US fixed income markets are markets predicting two cuts into year-end, which have been interpreted as a combination of three main factors, 1) slower growth risk (“nominal recession”), 2) lower inflation and inflation expectations, which is inconsistent with recent data but consistent with leading indicators like oil prices, and 3) financial stability concerns, which combines tighter credit conditions post-SVB, debt ceiling political risk and bankruptcy risk as companies start to hit a “refinancing wall” in 3Q23.

- **GenAI.** It is clear in my mind that Generative Artificial Intelligence such as GPT3 is a game-changer technology. During a recent conference call with one of the world’s leading experts, it was compared to the invention of the Printing Press by Guttenberg, as beyond the clear implications for to enhance our productivity, GenAI is set to disrupt the way we learn. The applications and disruption will be major and the speed at which the changes are happening is truly staggering. One of the most obvious examples have been coding and programming where, if you were a well-paid programmer a few months ago chances are your job may be at risk or may even not exist anymore. But the implications go far beyond as the “double edge of technology” has positive uses (education, productivity, etc) but also negative uses (social manipulation, cyber-crime, deep fakes, etc) some of which are truly scary and, in my view, pose extraordinarily difficult ethical and social challenges to humanity and has brought the debate around regulation and control of AI has come to the front of global leaders.

## **2.2 The New Paradigm of High Inflation, High Volatility, and High Risk**

We believe global markets have entered a new paradigm that will be dominated by High Inflation, High Volatility, and High Risk, in many ways a complete reversal of the previous decade which was dominated by Artificially Low Inflation, Volatility and Risk.

Whilst the order in which is presented is somewhat interchangeable, the current driver of monetary policy remains inflation, which poses Central Banks with the extremely delicate task of hiking decisively enough to contain both inflation and inflation expectations without damaging the economy and/or exposing systemic risks.

The reality is Central Banks seem to have a foot on BOTH the accelerator and the break, as evident in the current US Regional Bank crisis, where they are delivering nominal hikes whilst printing money via protection programs in yet another example of Mike Tyson's eternal "everyone has a plan until they punch them in the face".

### **2.2.1. The New Paradigm of High Inflation**

I will use a bullet point format to keep arguments as exhaustive and concise as possible.

- Central Banks trapped between Inflation and Bubbles, both their own creations.
- When inflation expectations are low, Central Banks are in control. When high, they lose control. Thus the hikes.
- The Damage from decades of Monetary and Fiscal policies without limits may already done.
- We are currently in the "Twilight Zone" between Nominal and Real worlds.
- Economic data, such as "Growth", must differentiate between "Nominal Growth" and "Real Growth".
- We have so far avoided a "Nominal Recession" but are deeply into a "Real Recession".
- Real Inflation in our view 2x Official Inflation. Investors and savers are not stupid. Frogs on the move.
- Labour Strikes, Social Unrest, Populism, Wars are unfortunate second order effects of Inflation and Inequality.
- Systemic risks (such as US Regional Banks) require more printing and debt, will keep inflation structurally high.
- Central Banks cannot print Energy, but can subsidize it, transforming problem into devaluations and inflation.
- Central Banks may be forced to use Yield Curve Control to contain credit bubbles in Public and Private markets.
- YCC transforms credit bubbles into inflation. Beware of the end of YCC in Japan. Gray swan LDI squared ahoy.
- From a game theory perspective, due to lack Central Bank independence, likely End Game is Stagflation.

### **2.2.2. The New Paradigm of High Volatility**

- Strong opposing forces between inflation and systemic risks, consistent with high uncertainty and high volatility.
- Twilight Zone between Nominal and Real creating confusion, supportive of high realized and implied volatility.
- Fed dots for Dec25 showing massive divergence, 5.50% high vs 2.375% low, consistent with high volatility.
- Divergence of forecasts by analysts: from Hard landing to Soft landing to No Landing = volatility.
- Fixed Income markets have regained some defensive power via duration, but have lost reliability.
- Watch out for spike in volatility and correlations, particularly between Fixed Income and Equity markets.
- Low VIX contributing to short squeeze, as trend, vol target and risk parity forced to buy more with low volatility.
- Discretionary managers at historically max short in equities and fixed income.
- Disconnect between Macro Vol vs Equity Vol = Bear Market Rally, Short Squeezes.
- Geopolitical Risks on the rise. Risk of China providing "lethal aid" to Russia.

### **2.2.3. The New Paradigm of High Risk**

- Central Banks trapped Bubbles and Inflation, both their own creations.
- High inflation and inflation expectations forcing Central Banks to hike, for now.
- Equity Risk Premia. Equities are expensive both in absolute and real terms.
- Faced with systemic risk, Central Banks will always kick the can down the road and transform into inflation.

- The US Regional Banking crisis in our view the tip of a giant iceberg. Watch out reflexivity domino effects.
- Lower credit transmission will spread to Commercial Real Estate and economic activity.
- Nominal Left Tail (equity & credit sell off) = Loss capital. Real Left Tail (inflation) = Loss of purchase power.
- False Diversification = Hidden Leverage. Slow Motion Crash. Watch out for Credit Defaults.
- Taxes, in particular Wealth Taxes, how Central Banks and Governments "square the circle", another risk.

### 2.3. Implications for Portfolio Construction

- The Football Team Analogy: the striker, the defender/goalkeeper, and the coach.
- There is no crystal ball. Embrace Volatility. Don't fight it.
- Upsilon. Compounding on Capital Preservation.
- Unemotional vs Emotional Portfolio Rebalancing.
- Protecting Strategies vs Protected Strategies
- Long Only Options. V@R 100.
- Long Inflation Bias. Beware of assets that are short inflation.
- Equity divergence. Equity Margins vs Inflation: Price Power vs Purchase Power.

### 2.4. Additional Supportive Information

The following section presents some of the key concepts of the Anti-Bubble Contrarian Investment Framework with extracts from previous newsletters and links to some relevant articles and podcasts.

#### 2.4.1. Monetary and Fiscal Policies do NOT solve problems.

We believe **Monetary and Fiscal Policies do NOT solve problems**, but simply **delay, transfer, transform** and **enlarge** them. This simple framework has a wide range of applications and helps explain how Central Banks and Governments tend to deal with most of their problems, from energy subsidies, to banking bail-outs, to ever-increasing debt ceilings, all of which are a combination of the following four building blocks:

**2.4.1. Delay Problems via "Kick the can down the road" Spending and Debt.** A generational trade-off that benefits the current generation and the expense of future generations.

**2.4.2. Transfer Problems via Currency and Trade Wars.** Monetary policy is often portrayed as a domestic policy but historically has played a very important role in foreign policy via "beggar thy neighbour" **Currency Wars**, whereby competitive devaluations seek to, amongst other benefits, attract foreign investment, create domestic employment, and import/copy technologies at the expense and risk of currency weakness and its necessary evils: inflation and bubbles. **Trade Wars** and other forms of Protectionism are natural defence mechanisms to Currency Wars whereby Governments "defend themselves" via processes such as "if you devalue your currency by 20%, I will tariff you by 20%" designed to neutralize foreign competitive devaluations and protect local players but can result in inflationary pressures. Unlike previous crises, where Governments seek competitive devaluations to fuel growth at the expense of inflation, current inflation dynamics have changed and currency strength translates into a mechanism to **export inflation**.

**2.4.3. Transform Problems into Inflation and Inequality.** Let's not fool ourselves: Monetary and Fiscal policies-without-limits are THE primary reason for inflation and loss of purchase power. Central Banks and Governments have become addicted to money printing and debt and have taken advantage of deflationary forces in the system, such as technology, demographics, or overcapacity, amongst others, to print and borrow more money than they can afford fooled by the illusion financial stability and wealth creation.

**2.4.4. Enlarge Problems via Bubbles Too-Big-To-Fail and Stagflation, or worse.** It is very simple: artificially-low interest rates create artificially high valuations. At 0% nominal interest rates, the Present Value of \$100 cash flow in 1 year, 10 years, 100 years or 1000 years is \$100. No wonder all assets that are valued via discounted cash flow models have greatly benefited from the “duration” impact of artificially-low interest rates. The Wealth Effect (which I define as the illusion of wealth created by unrealized gains that cannot be realized) creates a virtuous reflexive cycle (fundamentals impact prices and prices impact fundamentals) on the way up, but a vicious reflexive cycle on the way down. We believe the normalization of monetary policy is “science fiction” as the burst of the debt and equity bubbles would create systemic havoc and thus why we believe Central Banks are trapped between inflation and bubbles and will invariably be forced to let inflation go in order to protect the bubbles.

## **2.5. The Frogs in Boiling Water: Inflation and Inflation Expectations**

**The Monetary Broth.** I believe we are all frogs in a “monetary broth” that has been steadily heated via money printing and debt at an official temperature of 2% per annum, where the 2% official inflation target is small enough that the frogs stay in the water, but high enough that the frogs are slowly boiled to death via compounding, “the most powerful force in the universe” according to Albert Einstein.

**Why do frogs jump out? Inflation and Inflation expectations.** Frogs jump for two main reasons, 1) they notice a large increase in current temperatures (current inflation), and 2) expect temperatures to continue to increase (inflation expectations). Central Banks are in control as long as the frogs stay in the water but lose control once the frogs start jumping out. The massive rise in inflation and inflation expectations forced Central Banks to panic hike at a pace never seen before hoping to entice the frogs to stay and/or return to the monetary broth.

**What happens when frogs jump out?** When frogs jump out of credit and fixed income, yields go up, which can put pressure on those heavily indebted and expose pockets of hidden leverage and systemic risk, which eventually may require Central Banks to intervene and print more money to prevent the collapse. The common belief is that “long-term yields go up because short-term rates go up” but the opposite is also possible, whereby “long-term yields go up because short-term rates were kept too low for too long”, which effectively creates inflation and inflation.

**Why some frogs never jump out? Benchmarks.** Many frogs stay in the water despite the obvious rise in temperature because they are literally tied to the bowl with handcuffs called Benchmarks. During period of high inflation, investments in cash, fixed income and credit have the potential to lose substantial purchase power, effectively financing the “monetary party” hosted by Central Banks and Governments.

## **2.6. The Three Levels of the Investment Game**

If Investing were a video game, it would have 3 levels.

**Level 1: Nominal Returns,** In Level 1 **inflation is perceived to be negligible.** The objective is to protect the capital and turn \$100 into more than \$100. Level 1 rewards savers via positive real yields and fixed income, credit, and cash play a valuable role in asset allocation and portfolio construction.

**Level 2: Real Returns.** In Level 2 **inflation is no longer negligible.** The objective changes and investors and



savers must generate returns above *their* rate of inflation (which may be different from official inflation). In Level 2, when inflation is substantially higher than nominal rates. Emerging Markets investors have been playing in level 2 for most of their lives and therefore have a big advantage over those who have not experienced extreme levels of inflation and/or currency devaluation. In the event that inflation is above nominal yields, persistent levels of negative real yields can dramatically reduce the purchase power of fixed income, credit, and cash, which transform from big winners to big losers

**Level 3: Real Returns after Taxes.** As Mark Twain said, “there are two certain things in life: death and taxes”. Taxes are high already, but will likely get much worse, especially **wealth taxes** and their derivatives like inheritance tax, mansion tax, etc. Higher wealth taxes is the mechanism by which Governments “square the circle”, as monetary and fiscal abuse eventually results in inflation and bubbles that make the rich richer and the poor poorer, which results in inequality, strikes, social unrest, and populism, that invariably result in higher taxes on the inflated assets. The problem, as discussed in a previous section, is the circle is not a zero-sum game, but rather an vicious cycle of forced currency devaluations and inflation and defaults, as it has been the case in Argentina.

### **2.7. The End Game: Stagflation?**

From a game theory perspective, the game is designed to finish in stagflation, the combination of high inflation and no economic growth. At the core of the thesis lies the lack of Central Bank independence, and how every Government, when faced with problems will always favour the short-term gain at the expense of the long-term pain.

**QE inflated bubbles.** Whilst the list of acronyms used by Central Banks and Governments around the world to implement their monetary and fiscal abuse, Quantitative Easing stands out. In the US alone, the Federal Reserve was printing money at a pace of \$120b per month, every month, for years. In Europe and Japan the experiment was pushed even further with the introduction of negative nominal yields, an aberration. There is extensive literature on this topic, including my book “The Anti-Bubbles: Opportunities heading into Lehman Squared and Gold’s Perfect Storm” (BEP, 2017). The consequences of QE and other forms of monetary and fiscal abuse contributed to artificially low interest rates, artificially high valuations, unsustainably high levels of debt and, of course, inflation.

**YCC transforms bubbles into inflation.** In Japan, decades of monetary and fiscal abuse have pushed Government debt towards 300% debt to GDP which required the introduction of a new mechanism called Yield Curve Control that would allow the BOJ to print “whatever it takes” to keep the 10-year JGB at the artificial level of 0.10% and prevent the credit bubble from imploding. In December 2022, the Bank of Japan, BOJ, surprised the market by opening the door to **the removal of Yield Curve Control**. Whilst the general view in the market is that this would be positive for both the Japanese Yen and for Japan, there are legitimate concerns that decades of artificially low interest rates could result in a “LDI squared”, where Japan could face the double whammy of credit distress from higher yields AND more, not less, printing via the re-introduction of YCC. The damage, I am afraid, may already be done, and the imbalances will show either in the form of massive devaluations and inflation, and/or credit events.

**Reasons for optimism.** I tend to dedicate my book with “I hope you will like it, and hope I will be proven wrong”, as I feel like a doctor diagnosing a terrible disease to a friend. As a doctor, I want to be correct, as a friend I want to be wrong. Whilst I am not optimistic, there are also reasons to be optimistic about the longer-term, including a resolution of the Russia/Ukraine conflict, or an improvement in the medium and long-term outlook for energy volumes and prices. Whilst the short-term supply dynamics are constrained by lack of

investment and infrastructure capacity, the major spike in natural gas prices following the Russia/Ukraine war has undoubtedly resulted in a major signal for investment in natural gas production, transportation, and storage around the world. As discussed in my first book “The Energy World is Flat: Opportunities from the end of Peak Oil” (Wiley, 2014), massive spikes in prices and volatility short-term tend to result in lower prices and volatility longer-term. It will take a few years to resolve, but some strong healthy deflationary forces may be underway and help partially or totally offset the unhealthy inflationary forces that I fear will be required to prevent the implosion of the credit bubbles in the system. Time will tell. In the meantime, I would recommend investors to continue to embrace, not fight, volatility.

#### 4. Additional Supportive Information

Previous issues of the Monthly Anti-Bubble Report available on request.

Live Webinar [Real Conversation with Hedgeye Keith McCullough](#) (recorded Mon 6th Feb 2023), where we discuss some important topics, including:

- The new paradigm of “**high inflation, high volatility and high risk**”. The next decade will be very different from the previous decade.
- Why Central Banks are **trapped between bubbles and inflation**, both their creation.
- Why **Central Banks will print more, not less**, as they will be forced to intervene to contain credit bubble collapse created by higher rates.
- **Yield Curve Control** is the mechanism that **transforms credit bubbles into inflation**. Watch out for Japan.
- The “**Frogs in boiling Water**” analogy. Implications for global markets and portfolio construction.
- How Currency wars has shifted from “beggar thy neighbour” to “**export inflation**” and thus why stronger USD is a wrecking ball for global.
- How the investment game has 3 levels: 1) nominal returns, 2) **real returns**, 3) real returns after taxes. We are now decisively in level 2.
- Why **China a credit time bomb**, likely to eventually implode via weaker CNH. Watch out for HKD peg.
- Energy subsidies another example how Governments don’t solve problems, simply **delay, transfer, transform, and enlarge problems**.
- Why **Geopolitical risks remain high**. Mind the tail risk from miscalculation and nuclear escalation in Russia / Ukraine.

Additional information. In case of interest, please find enclosed additional information about our contrarian ideas and framework:

- [Gold's Perfect Storm](#) (Financial Times Insight Column, front page written edition 8th Aug 2016)
- [The Energy World is Flat](#) (Financial Times Insight Column, 18th April 2016)
- [Real Conversation with Keith McCullough](#) (Hedgeye, 6th Feb 2023)
- [China is Running out of Options](#) (Macro Trading Floor, 24h July 2022)
- [How to hedge Inflation](#) (Kitco News, 30th Sep 2022)
- [Bitcoin: Bubble or Anti-Bubble?](#) (The End Game Series, 9th Feb 2021)
- [Portfolio Construction Masterclass](#) (Real Vision, 3rd Aug 2020)
- [Hmminar with Grant Williams](#) (Hmminar #15, 21st May 2020)

- [False Diversification](#) (MacroVoices podcast, 11th June 2020)
- [The Perpetual Search for Extreme Optionality](#) (The Felder Report Podcast, 1st Sep 2019)

I hope the ideas and strategies will be of your interest and remain at your disposal for any additional information or clarification you may need.

<b>Quadriga Strategy</b>	<b>Class</b>	<b>MTD</b>	<b>YTD</b>	<b>LTD</b>	<b>Factsheet</b>	<b>Newsletter</b>
Igneo UCITS (USD)	A	-2.8%	-9.6%	-21.5%	<a href="#">Igneo Apr23</a>	<a href="#">Subscribe</a>
Aqua UCITS (USD)	A	-1.2%	+6.5%	+61.5%	<a href="#">Aqua Apr23</a>	<a href="#">Subscribe</a>

Best regards and much health to all!

Diego Parrilla